NENA Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis Operations Information Document (OID)



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NENA OPERATIONS INFORMATION DOCUMENT

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1 Executive Overview

This document is provided to assist Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) with the development of Hazard and Vulnerability Analyses. These analyses are essentially audits that provide planning tools to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from incidents that have the potential to adversely affect the PSAPs ability to perform its critical functions. Every PSAP is unique and this document should be used as a starting point in disaster planning.

2 Introduction

2.1 Purpose and Scope of Document

This document is intended as a guide for PSAP staff to review the hazards and their individual vulnerability to hazards, which may adversely impact the PSAPs ability to serve their communities. This document is not intended as a template, but as a guide to the process of hazard and vulnerability analysis.

2.2 Reason to Implement

PSAPs are critical for the safety and security of the public. The potential for manmade and/or natural occurrences to prevent a PSAP from receiving, processing, dispatching and monitoring incidents places the public and first responders in danger. It is therefore incumbent on PSAP administrators to prepare for such occurrences.

2.3 Reason for Reissue

NENA reserves the right to modify this document. Whenever it is reissued, the reason(s) will be provided in this paragraph.

2.4 Recommendation for Standards Development Work

This document is intended to be used as a guide to assist with disaster planning. Current and future Standards regarding equipment, infrastructure and capability should be used to assist with disaster planning. In particular, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1221 and the NENA Communications Center/PSAP Disaster and Contingency Plans Model Recommendations should be utilized.

2.5 Cost Factors

PSAPs that require or desire to adequately prepare for disaster will incur expenses. These expenses will be unique to each PSAP based on their current resources and planning goals. Administrators are urged to look beyond the cost of planning and prevention to the potential cost of system failure.



2.6 Acronyms/Abbreviations

Some acronyms/abbreviations used in this document have not yet been included in the master glossary. After initial approval of this document, they will be included. Link to the master glossary is located at <u>http://www.nena.org/pages/ContentList.asp?CTID=5</u>.

The following Acronyms are used in this document:				
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association			
ANI	Automatic Number Identification			
ATIS	Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions			
PSAP	Public Safety Answering Point			
ACD	Automatic Call Distribution			
UPS	Uninterruptible Power Supply			
CAD	Computer Aided Dispatch			
AVL	Automatic Vehicle Location			
ALI	Automatic Location Identification			
The following <i>new terms</i> are included in this document:				
Automatic	A means for determining the geographic location of a vehicle and transmitting			
Vehicle Location	this information to a point where it can be used.			
(AVL)				

3 Components of an Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis

3.1 Phone Network

3.1.1 Customer isolation from Central Office or 9-1-1 tandems

Customer is not able to complete a phone call to 9-1-1 due to a failure of the path from the customer to the PSAP.

3.1.2 Central Office Failure

Call cannot be completed due to failure of the central Office to pass call to another central office or PSAP.

3.1.3 Enhanced 9-1-1 Central Office

Call cannot be completed because of a failure of the 9-1-1 tandem, selective router or other 9-1-1 specific equipment.

3.1.4 ANI/ALI Failure

Call made through dialing 9-1-1 is completed, but without ANI and/or ALI.

3.1.5 Contingency 10-Digit phone failure



Calls cannot be completed through 10-digit phone numbers.

3.1.6 Wireless 9-1-1 failures

Calls to 9-1-1 from wireless customers cannot be completed due to failure of wireless system.

3.2 PSAP Answering/Telephony Equipment

- 3.2.1 Selective Router
- 3.2.2 Automatic Call Distributor (ACD)

ACD does not direct calls or directs calls to unanswerable queue.

3.2.3 Answering Point Failure

Calls cannot be answered due to failure of answering equipment.

3.3 Physical Plant

3.3.1 External Power Supply

Feed from outside to the PSAP.

- 3.3.2 Back-up Power Supply UPS/Generator Systems.
- 3.3.3 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

Both staff comfort and as a means of entry into PSAP.

3.3.4 Water Supply

Water supply integrity into PSAP, water leakage in critical areas (9-1-1 center, phone room and transmitter room). Flooding.

- 3.3.5 Environmental
 - 3.3.5.1 Daily Operations

Air filtration systems, UPS Battery of Gassing, outside factors.

3.3.5.2 Emergency Operations

Generator impact, Air Filtration on back-up power.

3.3.6 Smoke/Fire detection and response

What level of smoke/fire detection is available? Does detection equipment meet NFPA 72-44 Chapter 6 Protected Premises Fire Alarm Systems?

3.3.7 Facility Security



Security into facility and security if facility is entered.

3.3.8 Grounding

Is the communications system properly grounded? Include, telephone equipment, Towers.

3.3.9 Facility Integrity

Is facility able to remain operational during disaster situation? Are plans in place for times when building integrity is in question?

3.4 Other Issues

- 3.4.1 Radio System
 - 3.4.1.1 Network Failure

What degradation will occur with radio system failure? How is the radio network protected?

3.4.1.2 Wire line Failure

Does the radio system rely on wire line and what are the impacts of wire line failure?

3.4.1.3 Tower Failure

Will a failure at a tower cause system-wide failure? If towers are connected via microwave is the system reversible? How is tower failure identified? Do towers meet the same level of site security as the PSAP?

3.4.1.4 Interference

Are plans in place to quickly identify and correct interference issues?

3.4.1.5 Radio Console

What impact is expected if radio consoles are lost? Plans should include information regarding console receive and transmit failures.

3.4.2 CAD/Mapping

Is CAD/Mapping secure from planned and inadvertent tampering? Does CAD/Mapping connect with the Internet in any way?

- 3.4.3 Interface Features (AVL, ALI)
- 3.4.4 Staffing

Analysis should be performed regarding reasons for staffing issues and the expected impact on service.



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4 **References**

National Fire Alarm Code, 72-44, Chapter 6, Protected Premises Fire alarm Systems National Fire Protection Association, Standard 1221, Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services Communications Systems.

Alexander, David, <u>Principles of Emergency Planning and Management</u>, Oxford University Press 2002



5 Exhibits

5.1 Hazard Checklist

Hazard Checklist

Hazard:

Brief description of scenario:

Location:

Characterization

□ natural □ technological □ human □ secondary □ complex

Probability of occurrence

□ calculable □ hypothesized □ unknown □ independent of past events □ dependent of past events

Frequency

 \Box regular (e.g. seasonal) \Box some regularity \Box random

Pattern of impact

 \Box sudden catastrophe \Box rapid build-up (<24h) \Box slow build-up

Duration

 \Box seconds \Box minutes \Box hours \Box days \Box weeks \Box months \Box years

Area of Impact

□ widespread □ local □ site specific

Short-term predictability (forecast capability)

Location 🛛 predictable 🗖 variable but generally known 🗖 unpredictable

Timing I highly predictable I very predictable I somewhat predictable highly unpredictable

Warning capability

 \Box very high \Box high \Box moderate \Box low \Box very low



Controllability (can physical process be stopped?)							
definitely	□ probably □	possibly	🗖 no				
General assessments							
Vulnerability		very high	🗖 high	□ modera	te 🗖 low	□ very low	
Risk levels		very high	🗖 high	□ modera	te 🗖 low	□ very low	
Preparedness le	evels						
□ very effective	effective	🗖 unknov	wn 🗖 in	effective	lacking		
Structural and	semi-structura	l preparedn	ess				
□ very effective	effective	🗖 unknov	wn 🗆 ineffective 🗖 l		lacking		
Infrastructure J	preparedness						
□ very effective	e ffective	🗖 unknov	wn 🗖 in	effective	lacking		
Probable future impact levels							
□ very effective	effective	🗖 unknov	wn 🗖 in	effective	lacking		
Staff awareness of hazard							
□ very effective	effective	🗖 unknov	wn 🗖 in	effective	lacking		
Support for mitigation and preparedness measures							
□ very effective	effective	🗖 unknov	wn 🗖 in	effective	□ lacking		
General assessment of mitigation situation for this hazard							
□ very effective	effective	🗖 unknov	wn 🗖 in	effective	Iacking		



5.2 Hazard Profile Worksheet

HAZARD PROFILE WORKSHEET					
HAZARD:					
POTENTIAL MAGNITUDE (Percentage of the facility that ma	y be affected):				
 Catastrophic: More than 50 % Critical: 25 to 50% Limited: 10 to 25% Negligible: Less than 10% 					
FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE:	PATTERN:				
 Highly likely: Near 100% probability in next year. Likely: Between 10 and 100% probability in next year, or at least one chance in next 10 years. Possible: Between 1 and 10% probability in next year, or at least one chance in next 100 years. Unlikely: Less than 1% probability in next 100 years. 					
AREAS LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED:					
PROBABLE DURATION:					
POTENTIAL SPEED OF ONSET (Probable amount of warning time):					
 Minimal (or no) warning 6 to 12 hours warning 12 to 24 hours warning More than 24 hours warning 					
EXISTING WARNING MECHANISMS:					
COMPLETE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS:					
YesNo					



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5.3 Risk Assessment Worksheet

Area	Essential Facilities at Risk	
	Staff/Citizens at Risk	
	Infrastructure	0/ of Dependent
		% of Property
	Infrastructure O Severe Substartial	% of Property
	Infrastructure o Severe o Substantial o Minor	% of Property



5.4 Risk Index Worksheet

Hazard	Frequency	Magnitude	Warning Time	Severity	Special Characteristics and Planning Considerations	Risk Priority*
	 Highly likely Likely Possible Unlikely 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 	 Minimal 6-12 hours 12-24 hours 24+ hours 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 		
	 Highly likely Likely Possible Unlikely 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 	 Minimal 6-12 hours 12-24 hours 24+ hours 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 		
	 Highly likely Likely Possible Unlikely 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 	 Minimal 6-12 hours 12-24 hours 24+ hours 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 		
	 Highly likely Likely Possible Unlikely 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 	 Minimal 6-12 hours 12-24 hours 24+ hours 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 		
	 Highly likely Likely Possible Unlikely 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 	 Minimal 6-12 hours 12-24 hours 24+ hours 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 		
	 Highly likely Likely Possible Unlikely 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 	 Minimal 6-12 hours 12-24 hours 24+ hours 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 		
	 Highly likely Likely Possible Unlikely 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 	 Minimal 6-12 hours 12-24 hours 24+ hours 	 Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible 		

* High, Medium, Low

