NENA

Communications Center/PSAP Disaster and Contingency Plans Model Recommendation



NENA Communications Center/PSAP Disaster and Contingency Plans Model Recommendation Document 53-001 June 7, 2005

Prepared by:

National Emergency Number Association (NENA) SOP Committee, Contingency Planning Sub-Committee, Disaster Recovery Working Group

Published by NENA Printed in USA

NENA Operational Standard/Model Recommendation

NOTICE

This Operational Standard/Model Recommendation is published by the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) as an information source for the voluntary use of communication centers and is provided as an example only. It is not intended to be a complete operational directive.

NENA reserves the right to revise this for any reason including, but not limited to, conformity with criteria or standards promulgated by various regulatory agencies, utilization of advances in the state of operational techniques or services described herein.

It is possible that certain federal, state or local regulations may restrict or require modification of the recommendations contained in this document. Therefore, this document should not be the only source of information used. NENA members are advised to contact their legal counsel to ensure compatibility with local requirements.

By using this document, the user agrees that NENA will have no liability for any consequential, incidental, special, or punitive damages arising from use of the document.

NENA's Operations Committee has developed this document. Recommendations for change to this document may be submitted to:

National Emergency Number Association 4350 North Fairfax Drive Suite 750 Arlington, VA 22203-1695 800-332-3911 703-812-4600

Acknowledgments:

This document has been developed by the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) Disaster Recovery Working Group, Contingency Planning Sub-Committee, Standard Operating Procedures Committee.

The following individuals are recognized for their contributions in development of this document.

Members:	Company/Agency
Rick Jones – Operations Issues Director	NENA
Norm Forshee – Operations Committee Liaison (2004-2005)	St Clair County, IL ETSB
Bill Weaver – Operations Liaison (2003-2004)	Combix Corporation
Steve O'Conor, ENP – SOP Committee Chair	Brevard County, FL
John Haynes – Contingency Planning Sub-Committee Chair	Chester County, PA
Wendi Lively – Human Resources Sub-Committee Chair	Spartanburg, SC
Ed Marecki – Human Resources Sub-Committee Chair	Dover, DE
Linda Draughn-Woloski, ENP, Disaster Recovery WG Chair	9-1-1 Consulting
Roy Hamlin, Disaster Recovery WG	Miami, FL
Ben Robinett, Disaster Recovery WG	St. Charles County, MO
Susan Makky, Disaster Recovery WG	St. Charles County, MO
Paul Adams	Huntington County, IN
Mark Adler	Palm Beach County, FL
Marc Berryman	Greater Harris County, TX
Clay Carter	Huntington County, IN
Ruthie Doles	Pinellas County, FL
Tom Donohoe	Minneapolis, MN
Chuck Freeman	Pinellas County, FL
Sandi Hutchcroft	Dubuque, IA
Dick Nelson	Marion County, FL
Susan Pettingill	Orange County, FL
Benjamin Robinett	St. Charles County, MO
Fran Self	Palm Bay, FL
Julie Thruman	Rochelle, IL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW	5
2.	INTRODUCTION	6
2.1	PURPOSE AND SCOPE	6
2.2	REASON TO IMPLEMENT	
2.3	Benefits	6
2.4	TECHNICAL IMPACTS SUMMARY	6
2.5	DOCUMENT TERMINOLOGY	6
2.6	REASON FOR REISSUE	
2.7	Cost Factors	
2.8	Cost Recovery Considerations	
2.9	ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS	7
3.	DISASTER AND CONTINGENCY PLANS	7
3.1	Staffing	7
3.2	IT SECURITY	
3.3	REDUNDANT SYSTEMS	8
3.4	RATIONALE FOR EVACUATION	9
3.5	EVACUATION PROCEDURES	
3.5	RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATIONS	11
4.	REFERENCES	12
5	FXHIRITS	13

1. Executive Overview

This document is provided as a Model Recommendation for the creation of the Disaster and Contingency Planning section of a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for use by Communications Centers and/or PSAPs as guidance in the formulation of an agency SOP. Each agency is unique in it resources and operations. This document is a Model Recommendation and should be changed to meet the requirements of differing modes of operations.

The unique nature of Communications Centers/PSAPs requires that daily operations continue regardless of circumstance. It is therefore imperative that PSAPs have plans and procedures for circumstances that have the potential to adversely affect the ability of the staff to perform their duties.

This document includes guidelines and procedures on:

- Staffing
- IT Security
- Redundant Systems
- Situations requiring evacuation
- Evacuation Procedures
- Return to Normal Operations

2. Introduction

2.1 Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the NENA Model Recommendation for Disaster and Contingency Plans is to provide general guidelines for circumstances that may adversely impact the Communications Center/PSAP personnel to receive, process, dispatch and monitor emergency calls for assistance.

As each agency has unique resources and circumstances, this document should be changed to meet the individual needs of the Communications Center/PSAP as required to plan for disaster operations.

2.2 Reason to Implement

The NENA Model Recommendation for Disaster and Contingency Plans has been developed to provide standardized guidelines for use during disaster situations that may impact the Communication Center's/PSAP's ability to maintain normal operations.

2.3 Benefits

Implementation of this Model Recommendation as a Standard Operating Procedure will:

- Prepare Communications Centers/PSAPs for disaster situations.
- Provide guidelines for the orderly evacuation of the Communications Center.
- Provide guidelines for the return to normal operations.
- Increase the probability of maintaining functionality during a disaster situation.

2.4 Technical Impacts Summary

In the event of an evacuation of the Communications Center/PSAP, alternate means of call receipt, entry, dispatch and monitoring must be available. The technical impact will vary greatly dependent upon the size and complexity of the center. At a minimum the phone service provider, radio and Computer-Aided-Dispatch vendor should be consulted to review options for alternate call taking and dispatching services.

2.5 Document Terminology

The terms "shall", "must" and "required" are used throughout this document to indicate required parameters and to differentiate from those parameters that are recommendations. Recommendations are identified by the words "desirable" or "preferably".

2.6 Reason for Reissue

NENA reserves the right to modify this document. Whenever it is reissued, the reason(s) will be provided in this paragraph.

2.7 Cost Factors

It is recommended that a back-up facility be adequate to meet the basic needs of the system. It need not be a fully redundant, mirror of the primary Communications Center. The cost of this recommendation will vary greatly depending on the size and complexity of the system. Cost will include reoccurring and nonrecurring expenses, which will likewise be dependent upon the system.

Wherever feasible, a back-up facility should be dual use. An example of dual use is a back-up facility that is also used for telecommunicator training.

2.8 Cost Recovery Considerations

Cost Recovery will vary greatly depending on the jurisdiction of the Communication Center/PSAP. Administrators are urged to review their cost recovery legislation and apply for all available funding.

2.9 Acronyms/Abbreviations

The acronyms/abbreviations used in this document have been approved. The master glossary is located at http://www.nena.org/9-1-1TechStandards/nena_recommended_standards.htm

3. Disaster and Contingency Plans

3.1 Staffing

The supervisor is responsible for assuring that minimum staffing levels are met for each duty assignment. Minimum staffing means the predefined minimum number of staff required per shift. If minimum staffing levels are not being met the supervisor shall make every effort to complete staffing with overtime personnel who are fit for duty. If off duty personnel are not available and minimum staffing has not been met then the supervisor shall require that on duty personnel remain on duty until minimum staffing can be met or they reach maximum hours worked. Maximum hours worked is the predefined maximum allowable hours a telecommunicator is permitted to work between 8 hours of rest. If qualified telecommunicators are not available then off duty supervisory personnel shall fill positions to meet minimum staffing requirements.

- **3.1.1** During times of inclement weather telecommunicators should plan accordingly. This includes planning to arrive at work on time and preparing to stay for an extended time if required.
- **3.1.2** Safe transportation should be considered if travel conditions warrant.
- **3.1.3** Sleeping accommodations should be available for all staff staying at the Communications Center during disaster operations.
- **3.1.4** Food and comfort facilities should be available for all staff during disaster operations.

Commentary:

The safety of Communications Center staff will dictate both travel and the requirement to remain at the center. Staff who are not comfortable driving in certain weather conditions should make prior arraignments to arrive at work on time and, if necessary, remain at the Center for extended periods.

3.2 IT Security

Today's Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) face more threats than ever before. From hackers to intruders to inadvertent user error PSAPs must carefully protect their information technology components. The availability of a PSAP can be directly impacted by any of the aforementioned threats and as such an in-depth approach to IT Security is required.

IT Security can be defined as "the protection of information systems against unauthorized access to or unauthorized modification of information whether in storage, processing or transit, and against the denial of service to authorized users, including those measures necessary to detect, document and counter such threats" [Source: Department of Defense "Information Assurance Policy and Technology" Computer Based Training CD, Version 1.0, October 2003]

Any Contingency or Disaster Recovery Plan should include appropriate IT security measures. Please refer to an upcoming Technical Information Document from the NENA Security Working Group that addresses IT Security as it relates to the PSAP in greater detail.

3.3 Redundant Systems

Component failure is inevitable. Any issue which hinders the ability to receive, process, dispatch and monitor emergency calls must be quickly handled with minimal disruption. Redundant systems are needed to continue operation when a failure causes the loss of a needed resource. These systems include but are not limited to:

3.3.1 Electrical power

3.2.1.1 The Communications Center will have at least one back-up generator with the capacity to operate all essential electrical components of the system.

- **3.2.1.2** All console equipment and radio equipment shall have Uninterrupted Power Supply.
- **3.2.1.3** Back-up power supply will have the ability to run indefinitely so long as fuel is available.

3.3.2 Telephone service

- **3.3.2.1** The Communications Center shall have a procedure to reroute emergency phone calls in the event of a failure of the primary phone system. This may be accomplished by several means:
 - Advance Intelligent Network which directs calls to back-up numbers. These numbers may terminate at the console or at a secondary site.
 - Transfer calls to an alternate PSAP. The alternate PSAP can be another jurisdiction or a back-up facility.
- **3.3.2.2** The Communications Center shall have access to the Emergency Alert System (EAS) to notify citizens in the event that 9-1-1 cannot be dialed. The notification shall have procedures for reporting emergencies.

3.3.3 Public Safety Radio Network

- **3.3.3.1** The Communications Center shall have a means of alerting and communicating with emergency responders in the event of a failure of the Public Safety Radio Network.
- **3.3.3.2** The back-up radio system should be readily available and routinely tested to ensure operational functionality.

3.2.4 Computer-Aided-Dispatch

The Communications Center shall have a procedure to maintain operations in the event that the Computer-Aided-Dispatch system fails.

Commentary:

The method of redundancy will vary between Communications Centers. It is desirable to have at least two layers of redundancy for each major component of the system. All redundant systems should be tested for operability no less than monthly.

3.4 Rationale for Evacuation

Relocation of personnel may be required for many specific reasons. The two main factors requiring evacuation of the PSAP are:

- Uninhabitable environment
- Infrastructure failure

3.4.1 Uninhabitable Environment

Situations which make the Communications Center unsafe for personnel to continue daily operations. These conditions may include but are not limited to:

- Bomb Threats/Found
- Fire/Smoke Condition
- Gas leak
- Hazardous Materials
- Structural damage

3.4.2 Infrastructure Failure

Situations during which technical components of the system fail - within or leading to the Communications Center. These conditions may include but are not limited to:

- Phone service outage
- Radio component damage

Commentary:

The reason for the need to evacuate is unimportant except for the urgency of removing personnel from a hazardous situation. It is desirable, if primary infrastructure is intact, that it be used during evacuation.

3.5 Evacuation Procedures

The Director or Designee shall have the authority to activate all or any part of the Disaster and Contingency Plan.

3.5.1 On Duty Supervisor

- Notify off duty staff to respond to alternate site
- Direct non committed personnel to evacuate to alternate site
- Notify telephone company and when appropriate activate contingency routing of emergency phone calls. Ensure that routing includes both 9-1-1 trunks and other emergency lines.
- Notify radio contractor
- Ensure alternate PSAP is staffed/notified of evacuation
- Notify other PSAPs of evacuation and termination of direct lines

- Alternate Route Law Enforcement Terminals
- Notify Nuclear facilities of evacuation
- Ensure all emergency responders are notified of evacuation
- Ensure the evacuation of all staff
- Confirm routing of emergency calls and ability to communicate with emergency responders

3.5.2 On Duty Telecommunicators

- Maintain operations until directed to evacuate
- Notify emergency responders of relocation
- Evacuate and report to assigned duty station as directed by supervisor

3.5.3 Off Duty Telecommunicators

• Report to assigned duty station as directed by supervisor

Commentary:

Evacuation procedures and duties must be adapted to the individual circumstances of the implementing agency. PSAPs should establish procures which provide for a quick transfer of operations from one location to another. Intermediate evacuation steps such as a mobile communications vehicle with phone and radio communications to maintain operations until the back up site is staffed will enhance the system and maintain service.

3.5 Return to Normal Operations

Prior to a return to normal operations; the Communications Center should be thoroughly assessed to ensure that it is safe for personnel to return. If the event was an infrastructure incident then all technical contractors should assess their equipment for operational functionality. When the Communications Center has been assessed and all components found to be in normal working order the authorization to return to normal operations will be given

3.5.1 On Duty Supervisor

- Notify designated staff to return to Communications Center
- Ensure staffing of a back-up site until Communications Center is prepared to resume normal operations
- Notify telephone company and when appropriate activate normal routing of 9-1-1 trunks and other emergency phone lines
- Notify radio contractor

- Notify other PSAPs of return to normal operations and resumption of direct lines
- Reverse alternate routing of Law Enforcement Terminals
- Notify Nuclear facilities of return to normal operations
- Ensure all emergency responders are notified
- Ensure all personnel are accounted for
- Confirm routing of emergency calls and ability to communicate with emergency responders
- Release off duty Telecommunicators

3.5.2 On Duty Telecommunicators

- Maintain operations until directed return to Communications Center
- Notify emergency responders of relocation
- Report to assigned duty station as directed by supervisor

3.5.3 Off Duty Telecommunicators

Maintain operations until directed to cease as directed by supervisor

Commentary:

Return to Normal Operations procedures and duties must be adapted to the individual circumstances of the implementing agency. PSAPs should establish procures which provide for a quick transfer of operations from one location to another. Intermediate relocation steps such as a mobile communications vehicle with phone and radio communications to maintain operations until the primary site is staffed and ready will enhance the system and maintain service.

4. References

Not applicable

5. Exhibits

- A. Evacuation checklist (sample)
- B. Return to normal operations checklist (sample)

Commentary:

Checklists provide guidelines for tasks that must be completed. Each Communications Center/PSAP should develop checklist unique to their circumstances for evacuation and return to normal operations.

Exhibit A. Evacuation Checklist (sample)

On Duty Supervisor		
	Off Duty Staff notified (Page group)	
	Priority Radio and MDT message	
	Phone Company Special Circuits (XXX) XXX-XXXX notify only	
	Radio Contractor (XXX) XXX-XXXX (Page Group)	
	ARES/RACES (Page Group)	
	Other County PSAPs	
	Local Emergency Management (such as municipal, county and/or parish)	
	State Emergency Management	
	Law Enforcement Terminal (Alt. Route to XXXXXXX)	
	Remote Site Operational	
	Contingency route 9-1-1 and emergency lines	
	Relocate unassigned personnel	
	Account for personnel	
	Director	
	Commissioners/Staff Notified	
	Supervisors Checklist reviewed	
	Technician response	
	Administrative staff response	
	PIO response	
	Remote sites notified/staffed/operational	
	Radios/pagers tested	
	CLEAN terminal forwarded	
	Contingency call routing directed	
	Staff Accounted for and assigned	
	Technical Manager	
	Technical staff responding	
	Radio Techs responding	
	Phone Techs responding	
	Radios operational	
	Phones Operational	
	Pagers operational	
	Contingency routing directed (Director)	

Exhibit B. Return to Normal Operations Checklist (sample)

On Duty Supervisor
Assign staff to return to Communications Center
 Priority Radio canceled and MDT message
Phone Company Special Circuits (XXX) XXX-XXXX notify only
 Radio Contractor (XXX) XXX-XXXX
 ARES/RACES
 Other County PSAPs
 Local Emergency Management (such as municipal, county and/or parish)
 State Emergency Management
 Law Enforcement Terminal (Reverse Alt. Route to XXXXXXX)
 Cancel contingency routing of 9-1-1 and emergency lines
 Release unassigned personnel
 Account for on duty personnel
Director
 Ensure safety of Communications Center
 Technical Manager ensures system operational
 Commissioners/Staff Notified
 Supervisors Checklist reviewed
 Communications Center notified/staffed/operational
 Radios/pagers tested
 Reverse Law Enforcement Terminal Alternate Routing
 Cancel contingency call routing directed
 Staff Accounted for and assigned or released
 Remote site re-supplied and operational
 After-action report completed
Technical Manager
 All systems operational
 Notify Director that Communications Center Operational Release technicians